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Abstract	
Contemporary	discussions	of	human-environment	relations	see	habits	as	enabling	
forces	of	change	(becoming)	in	contrast	to	traditional	views	of	habit	as	routine	and	
restrictive	elements	of	identity	(being).		Vital	life	(becoming)	is	realised	in	habit	
through	body	repetition	(Ravaisson)	or	through	material	force	(Deleuze).	This	paper	
argues	for	the	significance	of	the	pragmatist	work	of	John	Dewey	that	shares	this	
dispositional,	enabling	view	of	habit,	but	denies	any	dualism	between	life	and	
mechanism.		The	paper	explores	Dewey’s	idea	of	habits	as	mechanisms	of	natural	
forms	of	organisation	that	have	different	life	force,	depending	on	the	situational	
qualities	of	environment-human	transactions.	This	approach	also	implicates	habit	in	
problematisation.		The	paper	goes	on	to	discuss	the	implications	of	pragmatist	
thinking	for	understanding	human-environment	relations	and	the	place	that	habits	
have	in	intervening	in	and	reforming	those	relations	through	social	activism	and	
public	policy.		
	
Introduction	
Human-environment	relations	are	the	heart	of	human	geography.		The	way	that	
humans	interact	with	their	environments	(be	they	natural	or	social)	has	taken	a	
particular	turn	in	recent	geographical	research	in	terms	of	a	renewed	interest	in	
habits,	which	are	seen	as	intermediaries	in	human-environment	relations.		Rather	
than	seeing	habits	as	conservative	forces	of	routine	behaviour,	recent	geographical	
attention	has	focused	on	habits	as	forms	of	becoming	and	as	vectors	of	change	
(Dewsbury	2011;	Lea	et	al	2015;	Sharpe	2012).		This	is	in	part	a	result	of	taking	
environmental	processes	as	much	more	part	of	habit	formation	by	conceiving	of	the	
environment	as	‘vital’	(in	having	a	life	force	beyond	its	constituent	parts)	or	materials	
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of	the	environment	(inorganic	as	well	as	organic)	as	having	life;	‘forceful	materialism’	
as	Dewsbury	and	Bissell	(2015)	have	defined	it.		Geographers	refer	to	Felix	
Ravaisson’s	Of	Habit	(2008	[1838])	as	the	source	of	the	vitalist	idea	of	habit,	or	to	
Gilles	Deleuze	(1995)	for	the	materialist	version.		Both	these	approaches	accord	
autonomy	to	life	force.	In	this	paper	I	contrast	these	ideas	with	the	ideas	of	habit	in	
pragmatist	philosophy,	which	also	see	the	environment	as	vital	and	habits	as	
projective,	acknowledging	life	force,	but	seeing	it	as	emerging	from	natural	
mechanisms	of	organisation	(of	which	habit	is	one).	I	suggest	how	the	naturalism	of	
pragmatist	philosopher	John	Dewey	situates	habit	as	life	force	and	organisation	in	a	
way	that	also	acknowledges	environmental	forces	beyond	human	purposes.		This	
explains	in	part	the	intractability	of	habits	(they	cannot	be	changed	by	an	act	of	
conscious	will	alone),	but	it	also	sees	mechanisms	in	the	environment	(in	the	way	
that	habits	are	inevitably	implicated	in	problematisation)	that	have	the	potential	to	
open	up	habits	to	more	conscious	human	intervention	and	change.		This	is	illustrated	
in	four	ways	for	policy	formulation	and	social	activism:	through	interventions	in	the	
formation	of	habits;	in	overcoming	the	clash	of	habits;	in	the	institutionalisation	of	
habits;	in	habits	as	background	conditions	of	wider	problematisations,	such	as	
environmentalism.	In	emphasising	a	pragmatic	understanding	of	habit	the	paper	is	
also	building	on	a	growing	interest	in	pragmatism	in	geography	more	widely	(for	
example,	Harney	et	al	2016;	Wood	and	Smith	2008).	
	
Contemporary	discussions	of	habit	
The	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	humans	and	their	environment	has	seen	a	
shift	towards	according	more	force	to	the	environment	and	to	assemblages	of	non-
human	actants	(objects,	non-human	organisms)	as	well	as	humans	in	explaining	
activity,	action,	and	events	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987;	DaLanda	2016).		This	has	
been	part	of	seeing	humans	as	just	one	component	in	a	more-than-human	
environment	involving	a	flatter	ontology	of	what	constitutes	significant	activity,	one	
in	which	the	privileged	place	of	human	action	and	reason	has	been	deflated.			A	
more	‘vital’	environment	is	a	result	of	assembled	energies	seen	either	as	life	force,	or	
as	vital	matter/materiality.		This	is	underpinned	by	a	processual	ontology	that	sees	
all	phenomena	(including	what	might	be	seen	as	inert	materials/objects)	as	
emergent	or	becoming.		Stabilising	forces	that	maintain	continuity	are	re-evaluated	
including	the	idea	of	habit	–	seen	as	a	medium	of	ongoing	activity	between	
environment	and	humans	traditionally	conceived	as	routine	-	and	now	seen	as	a	
force	for	change.		In	this	reappraisal	of	habit	the	work	of	Felix	Raviasson	and	Gilles	
Deleuze	have	been	taken	up,	and	in	some	cases	in	comparison	with	the	pragmatist	
philosophy	John	Dewey.	
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Comparisons	between	pragmatism	and	Ravaisson’s	vitalism	have	been	made	across	
disciplinary	approaches	(with	themed	issues	on	habit	in	cultural	geographies	and	
Body	&	Society	in	2013).		In	his	discussion	of	the	genealogies	of	habit	Tony	Bennett	
(2013)	makes	the	distinction	between	treatments	of	habit	(including	Dewey’s)	that	
are	in	the	‘organic	memory’	tradition,	in	contrast	to	the	‘vitalist’	tradition	of	
Ravaisson,	Bergson	and	others.	The	organic	memory	tradition	is	post-Darwinian	and	
emphasises	the	evolutionary	influence	of	the	environment	on	organisms	“in	which	
habit	mediates	the	relations	between	inherited	and	acquired	competences”	
(Bennett,	2013,	113).		Henri	Bergson’s	vitalist	contribution	draws	on	evolutionary	
naturalism	and	materialism	but,	in	contrast	to	these	traditions,	accords	an	
autonomous	force	to	life	(Bennett	2013).		Bennett	discusses	Bergson’s	(2004	[1912])	
distinction	(from	Ravaisson)	between	‘habit-memory’	and	‘habit	proper’,	a	
distinction	also	evident	in	Deleuze’s	(1995)	distinction	between	‘sensory-motor	
habits’	and	‘primary	habits’.		The	point	of	these	distinctions	is	to	suggest	that	there	is	
a	more	profound	form	of	habit	(‘habit	proper’	or	‘primary	habits’)	that	comes	from	
vital	life	force	or	material	force	that	is	beyond	organic	mechanisms	and	that	makes	
habits	subject	to	unconscious/subconscious	change.			
In	geography	ideas	of	habit	have	been	addressed	at	different	times	in	ways	that	
reflect	certain	key	traditions	of	geographical	analysis.		Much	of	the	classic	work	in	
cultural	geography	at	the	turn	of	the	20
th
	century	was	concerned	with	establishing	
the	significance	of	the	role	of	culture	and	habits	of	life	in	‘genres	de	vie’	(Vidal	de	la	
Blache	1903)	and	sense	of	place	in	the	landscape	against	overly	deterministic	
interpretations	of	environmental	influences	on	human	activity	(Sauer	1925).		In	a	
related	way	in	the	1960s	and	70s	human	patterns	of	activity	and	their	routinized	
constraints	(such	as	spatial	path	dependencies	and	coupling	constraints)	were	also	at	
the	heart	of	time	geographies	(Hägerstrand	1970).			These	approaches	to	some	
extent	reflect	the	more	Kantian	idea	of	habit	as	routine,	especially	its	function	in	
place-making,	but	they	also	point	to	the	more	constructive	aspects	of	habit	in	the	
social	constitution	of	meaning	and	belonging	(Bissell	2015).			Further	work	in	
humanistic	geography	in	the	1970s	and	80s	developed	the	phenomenological	
aspects	of	meaningful	environments	and	the	importance	of	habit	in	feelings	of	
belonging	(Tuan	1977;	Ley	and	Samuels	1978).			
Phenomenology	also	influenced	work	in	humanistic	geography	that	highlighted	the	
significance	of	the	body	and	corporeality	as	the	locus	of	habit	in	understanding	
human/environment	relations.		Seamon’s	work	(1979),	for	example,	spatialised	the	
ideas	of	the	phenomenologist	Merleau-Ponty	through	the	analysis	of	‘body	ballets’	
and	time-space	routines	of	habit’	(see	also	Bissell	2015).		Merleau-Ponty’s	ideas	of	
inter-corporeality	and	the	significance	of	habit	in	influencing	more	cognitive	
interaction	are	developed	by	Lea	et	al	(2015)	(via	Crossley’s	2001	work)	in	their	
analysis	of	how	much	mindfulness	meditation	can	reflexively	change	habits.		Lea	et	
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al	see	agency	as	distributed	across	minds,	bodies	and	contexts	and	these	wider	time-
space	routines	compromise	the	ability	of	mindfulness	to	transform	habits.	Here	they	
are	registering	the	tension	between	habit	as	conservation	and	routine	and	habit	as	
capacity	and	projection.	
The	idea	of	the	distributed	nature	of	habit,	across	bodies	and	environments,	takes	us	
towards	the	interpretation	of	habit	in	geography	as	emergent	tendency	or	
potentiality.		Thus	Bissell	(2015)	sees	as	habit	as	a	‘virtual	infrastructure’	comprising	
propensities	and	dispositions	(Bissell	2015).		The	virtual	infrastructure	of	habit	can	
be	realised	in	practical	competences	in	coping	with	new	milieu,	but	with	changing	
intensities	(tracked	in	the	example	of	long-haul	air	travel)	that	in	turn	affects	the	
capacities	of	bodies	to	act	(see	also	Hynes	and	Sharpe	2015).		
Analysing	the	significance	of	the	distributed	nature	of	habit	for	transport	geography	
Schwanen	et	al	(2012)	make	an	insightful	comparison	of	Ravaisson’s	and	John	
Dewey’s	ideas.	They	acknowledge	the	similarities	between	Dewey	and	Ravaisson	in	
seeing	habit	as	a	tendency	and	of	the	dynamic	and	projective	aspects	of	habit.	They	
also	note	a	more	environmentally	distributed	idea	of	habit	in	Dewey’s	work,	in	
comparison	with	Ravaisson’s	more	individualistic	framing.		This	also	applies	to	the	
relationship	between	habits	and	the	inevitable	clash	of	habits,	both	within	the	
individual	organism,	and	between	habits	in	a	more	social	sense,	in	terms	of	customs	
and	institutions.	This	is	part	of	Dewey’s	argument	on	habits	in	relation	to	social	
change	and	social	division,	giving	his	approach	a	greater	radical	edge,	according	to	
Schwanen	et	al	(discussed	later).	They	see	the	main	distinction	between	Ravaisson	
and	Dewey	in	Ravaisson’s	idea	of	habit	as	a	way	of	understanding	the	unity	and	
continuity	of	nature	whereas	Dewey	is	not	prepared	to	“admit	to	the	improvised	
spontaneity	of	all	life”	because	this	“would	be	to	lose	sight	of	the	dialectical	
formation	of	the	social	that	is	so	crucial	to	pragmatism”	(Hynes	and	Sharpe	2015,	69,	
referring	to	Schoenbach	2004).			
I	will	take	up	the	question	of	these	divisions	between	‘life’	and	mechanisms	in	the	
rest	of	the	paper,	suffice	to	say	that,	assuming	the	unity	and	continuity	of	nature	and	
the	autonomous	force	of	life	takes	us	into	treatments	of	habit	in	geography	that	see	
it	as	a	contraction	of	wider	worldly,	immanent	forces,	certain	stabilisations	of	which,	
individuate	or	entrain	subjectivities	(Dewsbury	2015).		This	more	open	interpretation	
of	habit	as	a	form	of	becoming	is	seen	in	geography	in	non-representational	
approaches.		Thus	Thrift	(2007)	shifts	the	emphasis	on	the	historicity	of	practices	and	
habits	(Bourdieu	1977)	towards	their	spatialities	and	their	performative	and	
processual	qualities.		This	also	entails	virtualities,	the	potentialities	of	practices	and	
their	dispersive,	differentiating	qualities,	(rather	than	being	conserving	and	
consolidating).		This	starts	to	open	up	the	more	emergent,	projective	idea	of	habit	
within	geography.		Dewsbury	(2015),	for	example,	analyses	Deleuze’s	idea	of	habit	
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(via	Ravaisson)	as	passive	openness	to	a	changing	world	in	which	habit	is	as	‘an	
occupation’	enabled	by	‘material	affordances’	of	the	landscape,	that,	rather	than	
restricting	action,	allows	subjects	to	be	attentive	to	new	elements	that	can	be	taken	
from	repetition.		Repetitions	are	seen	as	singularities	and	a	form	of	difference,	
rather	than	iterations	of	sameness.	In	this	way	habit	provides	the	basis	for	an	
enduring	sense	of	self	(Dewsbury	2015,	32).		
Thus	in	geography	we	have	seen	a	range	of	interpretations	of	habit,	from	neo-	
Kantian	conservation	and	routine,	(particularly	in	relation	to	place-making),	through	
to	habit	as	a	contraction	of	mobile	forces	out	of	which	(contingent)	forms	of	
subjectivity	are	entrained.		In	the	rest	of	this	paper	I	want	to	address	this	shift	from	
habit	as	mechanism/routine	to	habit	as	contraction	of	life	force	by	first	of	all	taking	a	
step	back	to	acknowledge	the	long-standing	philosophical	distinction	between	ideas	
of	life	force	and	forms	of	natural	organisation/mechanism	that	lie	behind	the	
distinctions	made	between	Raviasson	and	Dewey.		In	the	course	of	this	discussion	I	
argue	for	the	value	of	Deweyan	pragmatism	in	capturing	both	vitalist	ideas	of	the	
environment	alongside	forms	of	activity	(especially,	but	not	exclusively,	human	
activity)	as	forms	of	natural	organisation/mechanism.	Rather	than	reproducing	the	
division	between	life	and	mechanism	pragmatism	suggests	how	to	hold	them	
together	but	in	a	way	that	life	(even	spontaneous	life)	emerges	from	mechanisms.	
This	involves	an	exploration	of	a	worldly	idea	of	habit	and	the	role	of	‘experience’	in	
the	contraction	of	wider	material	forces.		To	do	this	the	paper	first	discusses	
Ravaisson,	Deleuze	and	Dewey’s	ideas	of	habit	in	more	detail	before	going	on	to	
compare	them.	
	
Ravaisson	and	Deleuze	on	habit	
Ravaisson	situates	habit	firmly	in	an	Aristotelian	tradition	that	sees	habit	as	a	
facilitative	life	force	that	reaches	down	into	nature	(Ravaisson	2008;	Carlisle,	2013).	
It	is	a	product	of	repetition,	not	as	routine,	but	as	the	acquisition	of	capacities	
through	the	body.	Habit	observes	a	‘double	law’	for	Ravaisson.		As	an	activity	is	
repeated,	the	capacity	for	feeling	or	passion	(that	results	from	the	organism’s	
passivity	or	openness	to	the	world)	diminishes	and	the	capacity	for	movement	or	
action	is	strengthened.		At	the	same	time	repeated	habits	have	the	opposite	effect	
on	moral	conduct,	moving	from	active	to	passive,	from	sensation	and	moral	
sensibility	towards	more	unreflexive	action.		Habit	becomes	less	and	less	reflective	
and	more	and	more	capable,	thus	“habit	demonstrate[s]	continuity	between	
necessity	and	freedom,	will	and	nature”	(Carlisle,	2010:	123).	The	“habit-body”	is	a	
“dynamic	unity	of	capacities	and	dispositions	to	move,	to	sense,	to	experience,	and	
to	understand	in	particular	ways”	(Carlisle,	2013:	162-3).		These	acquired	capacities	
can	be	realised	in	different	ways	–	from	body	finesse	and	accomplishment	(a	form	of	
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‘grace’),	through	to	more	degraded,	compulsive	performativities	of	the	body	in	
forms	of	addiction.	For	Ravaisson,	moral	goodness	issues	out	of	nature,	as	a	
reflection	of	divine	spirit.		It	contrasts	with	the	more	traditional	Kantian	view,	which	
sees	habit	as	routine	behaviour,	and	as	a	restriction	or	impediment	to	reason,	that	
should	be	considered	separately	from	moral	life	(Carlisle,	2013).			
Ravaisson’s	Aristotelian,	more	expansive	idea	of	habit,	reaching	into	nature	and	
encompassing	the	tensions	of	vital	energies,	has	created	an	intellectual	legacy	–	
from	Ravaisson	to	Bergson	(2004)	and	his	idea	of	‘élan	vital’	and’	from	Bergson	
through	to	Deleuze	and	his	figurations	of	neo-vitalism	in	assemblages	of	materials	
and	organisms.	In	Deleuze’s	hands	(1995)	Ravaisson’s	vitalism	becomes	more	
materialist,	as	micro	or	molecular	repetitions	of	matter	accumulate	to	form	(new)	
habits,	mostly	sub-consciously.	Repetition	for	Deleuze	is	a	repetition	of	singularities,	
singularities	resulting	from	the	constant	production	of	life	and	matter	in	a	vibrant	
world.	It	inclines	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1987)	towards	a	view	of	nature	as	
mechanism	or	machine	(they	call	nature	a	‘war	machine’),	in	the	dualism	between	
life	and	mechanism.		However	that	mechanism	is	seen	in	materialist	terms	in	what	
Jane	Bennett	has	called	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	‘machinic	materialism’	(Bennett,	
2010).		It	is	an	insistent	force	of	matter,	“the	thousands	of	passive	syntheses	of	
which	we	are	organically	composed”	(Deleuze,	1995,	74)	that	insinuates	change	into	
‘primary	habits’
1
.	For	Deleuze	(1995)	changes	in	outward	performance	are	the	result	
of	intense	biological	activity	that	is	not	sensible	to	the	actor	as	habit	and	it	involves	
body-brain-environment	adaption	(Bissell,	2013:	122).		Again	it	gives	autonomy	to	
life	force	(as	machinic	materialism).	
Habit	for	Deleuze	is	a	contraction	of	matter	and	the	temporalities	emergent	from	
the	way	that	matter	(inorganic	through	to	organic)	contracts	the	forces	of	that	
comprise	its	present	condition:		“[m]ateriality	is	itself	a	tendency	to	elaboration,	to	
temporization,	the	process	of	becoming	alive	of	the	inorganic:	to	the	extent	that	
matter	can	contract	the	forces	that	produce	its	particular	form,	it	is	this	tendency,	
this	potentiality	or	this	virtual	orientation”	(Grosz	2013,	231).		This	virtual	orientation	
is	an	opening	out	“with	its	necessary	duplication	of	the	present	and	the	actual	with	
the	unspent	forces	of	the	past	and	the	virtual”	(233).		Repetition	is	a	repetition	of	
singularities	that	produce	difference	emerging	from	the	ramifying	force	of	life.		As	
Grosz	(2013)	defines	it,	from	a	Deleuzian	perspective,	“habit	is	the	point	of	transition	
between	living	beings	and	matter,	enabling	each	to	be	transformed	through	its	
engagement	with	the	other”	(Grosz	2013,	217).		She	goes	on	(and	in	a	way	that	
																																																								
1	In	pursuing	this	argument	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1987)	relinquish	their	naturalism	
for	a	more	transcendent	idea	of	the	constant	force	of	matter,	‘forceful	materialism’	
(Dewsbury	and	Bissell	2015).	Paul	Patton	has	argued	recently	(2016)	that	Deleuze	
cannot	be	seen	as	a	naturalist	philosopher,	relying	as	he	does	on	certain	
transcendental	ideals,	such	as	the	notion	of	‘absolute	de-territorialisation’.	
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uncannily	resonates	with	Dewey’s	idea	of	environment/organism	‘transactions’	-	
discussed	below)	“	…	habits	are	how	environments	impact	and	transform	the	forms	
of	life	they	accommodate	and	are	themselves	impacted	and	transformed	by	these	
forms	of	life”	(219).		Thus,	as	organisms,	“humans	emerge	from	a	contraction	of	
habits	which	are	stabilised	from	‘unthinking’	networks	of	relations”	(Colebrook	2016,	
258).	
The	idea	of	habit	as	a	contraction	of	matter	with	different	temporalities	reflects	how	
habit	has	a	complex	relationship	to	time	for	Deleuze	–	in	his	the	three	syntheses	of	
time.	Habit	involves	the	passive	syntheses	that	constitute	a	present	(first	synthesis);	
“habit	is	the	foundation	of	time,	the	moving	soil	occupied	by	the	passing	present”	
(Deleuze	1995,	79).		These	passive	syntheses	allow	for	sensation	and	receptivity	of	
the	organism,	the	syntheses	of	organic	and	inorganic	interactions	and	their	
temporalities,	in	the	body.		Memory	is	a	more	active	synthesis	of	time,	in	what	
Bergson	called	a	‘pure	past’	(second	synthesis).		Rather	than	the	present	being	an	‘is’	
and	the	past	an	‘is	not’	(or	has	been)	the	fleeting	nature	of	the	present,	‘is	not’	and	
the	pure	past	‘is’	through	the	selections	of	memory	(Smith	2013).		But	the	active	
synthesis	of	memory	requires	the	passive	synthesis	of	habit	such	that	“habit	is	the	
constitutive	root	of	the	subject,	and	the	subject	at	root	is	the	synthesis	of	time	-	the	
synthesis	of	the	present	and	the	past	in	the	light	of	the	future”	(Deleuze	1991,	93).		
Thus	time	is	a	manifold	of	active	and	passive	syntheses.		Memory	causes	the	present	
to	flow	back	into	the	past,	to	be	what	the	present	is	for	the	past.		But	whilst	memory	
particularises	time	these	particularities	aren’t	necessarily	different	moments	
(O’Keefe	2016).		Similarly	habit	tends	to	smooth	time,	to	make	it	into	generalities.		
For	Deleuze	both	memory	and	habit	must	be	resisted	in	favour	of	repetition,	as	a	
form	of	anticipation	or	virtuality	that	differentiates	and	repeats	only	singularities	
(see	O’Keefe	2016,	85-87)	to	produce	the	new	(future),	or	third	synthesis	of	time.	
The	tensions	and	complexities	of	Deleuze’s	rendering	of	time	are	spatialised	by	
geographers	by	developing	his	ideas	of	assemblage,	territorialisation	and	de-
territorialisation.		Habits	can	be	seen	as	mind-body-matter	assemblages	through	
which,	the	contraction	of	matter	works,	from	‘the	thousands	of	passive	syntheses’	of	
matter	all	the	way	through	to	discursive	formations	and	territorialisations	of	more	
enduring	meaning.		There	are	excellent	exemplifications	of	this	in,	for	example,	
Dewsbury’s	(2015)	example	of	the	instantiation	of	matter	via	body	routine	within	the	
habit	landscapes	(and	discursive	formations)	of	military	drill	(discussed	above).			
The	Ravaisson/Deleuze	vitalist	approach	sees	habit	as	a	contraction	of	life	force	that,	
through	its	‘occupation’	of	forces,	makes	change	possible.	Habits	are	plastic	
(Dewsbury	2015)	and	thus	distinct	from	habit	as	mechanism	or	form	of	organisation,	
especially	any	kind	of	self-legislating	organisation	that	one	might	accord	to	humans.			
This	latter	point	is	where	discussions	of	habit	in	the	Ravaissonian/Deleuzian	mould	
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acknowledge	but	then	veer	away	from	more	pragmatist	accounts	of	habit	(seen	as	
social	mechanisms	which	can	be	reformed).		We	now	turn	in	more	detail	to	those	
pragmatist	accounts.	
			
Dewey	on	habit,	situation	and	experience	
Habits	are	central	to	John	Dewey’s	pragmatist	philosophy	of	organism-environment	
activity.		They	can	be	seen	as	primary	units	of	orientation	of	life	activity,	or	life	
function.		Dewey	defines	habit	as:	
“that	kind	of	human	activity	which	is	influenced	by	prior	activity	and	in	that	sense	
acquired;	which	contains	within	itself	a	certain	ordering	or	systemisation	of	minor	
elements	of	action;	which	is	projective,	dynamic	in	quality,	ready	for	overt	
manifestation”	(Dewey	1981a:	31-2,	my	emphasis).			
The	ordering	or	systemisation	involves	habits	in	“setting	up	a	mechanism	of	action,	
physiologically	ingrained,	which	operates	‘spontaneously’	automatically	whenever	
the	cue	is	given.	But	mechanization	is	not	of	necessity	all	there	is	to	habit”	(Dewey	
1981a:	50).		By	this	Dewey	means	that	habits	are	also	enabling	(see	also	Schwanen	et	
al	2012).		Like	Ravaisson,	Dewey	takes	an	explicitly	Aristotelian	interpretation	of	
habits	as	capacities	rather	than	constraints,	which	are	as	much	environmental	as	
purely	organic.	They	are	“things	done	by	the	environment	by	means	of	organic	
structures	or	acquired	dispositions”	(Dewey	1981a:	15).	Thus	“functions	and	habits	
are	ways	of	using	and	incorporating	the	environment	in	which	the	latter	has	its	say	
as	surely	as	the	former”	(p.	15,	my	emphasis).	Since	habits	are	(in	part)	in	the	
environment	they	are	also	not	confined	within	organisms,	let	alone	human	
organisms.		They	comprise	“mind-body-environmental	assemblages”	(Bennett	et	al	
2013,	12)	that	are	constantly	interrelated,	such	that	certain	organic	actions	are	also	
environmental	adjustments.	This	tension	between	human	habits	and	environment	
can	be	thought	of	a	stretching	or	straining	of	human	organic	relations	with	their	
environments,	which	is	encapsulated	in	Dewey’s	core	idea	of	‘transaction’.	
			
Transaction	refers	to	the	ongoing	co-constitution	of	organism	and	environment.	By	
this	Dewey	means	that	environment-organism	relations	are	not	those	of	interaction	
between	rounded-out	objects	and	complete	humans	but	are	rather	co-constitutive	
processual	relationships.		Thus	organic	responses	to	an	object	or	an	environmental	
feature	are	not	to	it	but	into	it	(Dewey,	1896:	358).		Organic	activity	is	not	confined	
to	the	organism	itself	but	is	“as	much	in	processes	across	and	‘through’	as	in	
processes	‘within’	skins”	(Dewey	2008b:	119;	Sullivan	2001).		This	dissolving	of	the	
distinctions	between	organism	and	environment	is	part	of	Dewey’s	wider	pragmatist	
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effort	to	dissolve	other	traditional	philosophical	dualisms:	-	of	subject-object,	mind-
body	and	culture-nature.		
Habits	are	bundles	of	environment-organism	transactions	and	are	in	particular	
associated	with	all	mobile	higher	organisms.		They	contain	forms	of	intelligent	
response	to	the	environment,	instilled	in	bodies	(what	Dewey	called	‘had’	knowledge	
-	knowledge	that	is	intelligent	but	non-cognitive,	as	opposed	to	more	reflective	
‘known’	knowledge).		Habits	apply	to	higher	organisms	as	a	result	of	their	more	
complex	organisation	in	the	way	that	they	transact	with	the	environment:	
	“In	contrast	with	lower	organisms	…	a	higher	organism	acts	with	reference	to	a	
spread	out	environment	as	a	single	situation.		What	these	higher	organisms	do	is	
conditioned	by	consequences	of	past	activities:	there	is	learning	or	habit-formation.		
In	consequence,	an	organism	acts	with	reference	to	a	time-spread,	a	serial	order	of	
events,	as	a	unit,	just	as	it	does	in	reference	to	a	unified	spatial	variety	…	The	action	
called	organic	is	not	just	that	of	internal	structures;	it	is	an	integration	of	organic-
environmental	connections”	(Dewey	1981b:	213,	my	emphases).		
There	are	two	key	points	here.		The	first	is	that	organic	activity	is	as	much	a	function	
of	environmental	relations	as	it	is	of	relations	that	are	internal	to	the	organism.		The	
second	is	that	the	idea	of	‘situation’	is	key	for	Deweyan	pragmatism;	“the	existence	
of	situations	is	a	primary	fact”	(Dewey	2012,	239fn).		If	habits	are	projective	
dispositions,	situations	are	extensive	and	enduring	fields,	or	modalities,	of	those	
dispositions.		This	is	a	function	of	the	fact	that	higher	organisms	rely	on	more	varied	
and	complex	mixes	of	environments,	which	increases	their	vulnerability	but	also	
enriches	their	habits	and	capacities	for	response.		
The	situational	contexts	of	habits	become	especially	important	when	environment-
organism	functioning	encounters	obstacles	or	difficulties.		Where	situations	become	
unfamiliar	to	habitual	action,	or	when	established	habits	clash,	they	become	what	
Dewey	called	‘problematic	situations’	(Dewey	1986).		In	some	senses	this	unsettled	
situation	is	a	failure	of	habit	as	life	function	to	ensure	that	life	goes	on.	This	is	
experienced	qualitatively	by	higher	organisms	in	feelings	of	unease,	apprehension,	
fear	-	which	are	situational	(not	individual),	“it	is	the	situation	that	is,	for	example,	
apprehensive”	(Dewey	1981b:	xi).	The	experience	(including	emotional	force)	of	the	
disturbance,	is	situational,	as	are	the	subconscious	attempts	to	resolve	it	(re-
arranging	environmental	materials,	re-arranging	the	situation).	The	primary	energies	
of	habit	are	broken	down	in	the	situation	–	so	there	is	situational	conditioning	at	
work	as	well.		If	problematic	situations	challenge	habit	then	it	is	habit	that	is	the	first	
step	in	re-framing	the	problem-solution	(Dewey	1986).		Materials	in	the	situation	in	
part-frame	the	emergent	problem-solution	(rather	than	simply	relying	on	some	kind	
of	recall	from	organic	memory).	
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A	pragmatic	approach	thus	places	habit	in	relation	(on	a	continuum)	to	
problematisation	and	enquiry.		There	is	a	‘pattern	of	enquiry’	(Dewey	1986)	in	which	
habit	is	central.		Habit	is	both	the	medium	and	the	means	to	initiate	transformation.		
Equally,	habits	produce	actions	and	“the	act	must	come	before	thought	and	habit	
before	the	ability	to	evoke	thought	at	will”	(Dewey	1981a:	25).	Habits	are	the	basis	
for	(more	occasional)	reflective	thought	if	the	problematic	situation	cannot	be	
resolved	by	embodied,	non-cognitive	action.	The	base	of	the	adjustment	is	biological	
but	the	continuity	of	response	can	be	pushed	all	the	way	into	the	cognitive/reflective	
realm:	“...	The	need	for	this	redirection	is	the	base,	biologically,	of	tension	and	in-
tension,	of	at-tention	and	in-tention”	(Dewey	2012,	223).		‘Thought’	as	a	natural	
phenomenon	is	typically	social	rather	than	individual,	involving	communication	and	
conflict	over	problems.			‘Mind’	is	something	achieved	through	communication,	
rather	than	being	an	individual	cognitive	ability.	Clashes	of	habits	initiate	forms	of	
reasoning:	the	communicative	organisation	of	conflicting	or	diverse	habits	(Dewey	
1981b;	Bridge	2005).	
Habits	also	have	a	profound	role	in	the	pragmatist	epistemology	of	organism-
environment	relations,	as	part	of	a	wider	interpretation	of	the	idea	of	human	
‘experience’.		The	environment	here	is	the	“whole	biosociocultural	context	of	this	or	
that	experience”	(Fesmire,	2015,	51).		As	Dewey	argues:	
	
“experience	is	of	as	well	as	in	nature.		It	is	not	experience	that	is	experienced	but	
nature	–	stones,	plants,	animals,	diseases,	health,	temperature,	electricity	and	so	on.		
Things	interacting	in	certain	ways	are	experience	…	Experience	reaches	down	into	
nature;	it	has	depth.		It	also	has	breadth	and	to	an	infinitely	elastic	extent.		It	
stretches”	(Dewey	1981b:	12-13,	emphasis	in	original).	
Experience	encompasses	more	than	what	is	actively	‘known’.	It	is	limited	in	effects,	
both	in	evolutionary	time	and	being	dependent	“on	[natural]	forces	that	go	their	
own	way	without	our	wish	or	plan”	(Dewey	1981a:	200).	But	as	an	objective	(rather	
than	individual	or	subjective)	force,	experience	(of	higher	organisms)	contributes	to	
the	shaping	of	emergent	natural	processes.	This	is	in	part	because	higher	organisms,	
especially	humans,	are	extensively	interconnected	with	different	environments,	via	
‘situations’	or	fields	of	habit	dispositions	of	‘mind-body-environmental	assemblages’	
(Bennett	et	al	2013,	12).			
	
Comparing	Ravaisson,	Deleuze	and	Dewey	
Ravaisson,	Deleuze	and	Dewey	thus	see	habits	as	enabling	dispositions	and	forces	
that	are	implicated	in	change.			Nevertheless	there	are	marked	contrasts	between	
Dewey	and	Ravaisson’s/Deleuze’s	views	of	habit.		This	can	be	seen	in	a	number	of	
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interrelated	ways	through	their	ideas	of	habit	in	environment-organism	relations	and	
the	distinctions	between	life	and	mechanism.				
In	terms	of	habit	processes,	for	Ravaisson	habit	can	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	repetition	
resulting	in	a	range	of	performative	outcomes.		These	‘performative	practices’	are	
understood	as	the	ongoing	intensive	dynamics	of	habit,	where	repetition	is	
productive	of	difference	that	(unnoticed)	can	produce	a	permanent	change	in	
dispositions	(Dewsbury	and	Bissell	2015).	Dewey	agrees	that	habits	can	be	acquired	
by	repetition	(key	for	Ravaisson	and	Deleuze)	but	this	is	not	their	essence	(Pedwell,	
2016).	Rather	it	is	the	mode	of	response;	the	way	of	responding	to	situations	that	is	
key.	To	think	about	repetition	leading	to	habit	“puts	the	cart	before	the	horse”	
(Dewey	1986:	39):	it	is	because	organisms	have	habits	that	repetition	is	possible.		
Rather	than	the	possibility	of	aesthetic	refinement	in	bodily	movement	(for	example)	
being	a	manifestation	of	a	kind	of	harmonic	resonance	of	organism	and	environment	
(as	Ravaisson	suggests),	Dewey	sees	environmental	change	as	inevitable,	resulting	in	
problematic	situations.	Habits	are	those	bundles	of	environment-organism	
transactions	that	are	challenged,	as	well	as	being	the	initial	means	of	their	resolution,	
transformation,	or	adaptation.			
There	are	also	contrasting	attitudes	to	environment-organism	boundaries	and	
relations.	Ravaisson’s	and	Deleuze’s	interpretation	of	the	passivity	and	permeability	
of	the	organism	to	the	vital	environment	(as	life	force	or	material	force),	and	the	
imperceptible	changes	underlying	motor-sensory	changes	to	‘primary	habits’	that	
result,	from	a	Deweyan	perspective,	seems	too	one-directional	and	one-sided	in	
favour	of	life	force.		It	misses	out	the	organising	energies	and	modes	of	response	
that	we	can	see	in	the	relationship	between	habits,	and	between	situation	and	habit.	
In	transactional	terms	habits	“incorporate	an	environment	within	themselves.	They	
are	adjustments	of	the	environment,	not	merely	to	it”	(Dewey	1981a:	38,	emphasis	
in	original).	The	vital	force	of	repetition	conceived	by	Ravaisson	and	Deleuze	as	
primary	habits	cannot	imply	change	through	simple	life	force;	the	push	is	already	in	
part-organised	to	some	degree,	it	is	already	part	habit	(as	a	result	of	prior	
transactions).	This	is	why	Dewey	argues	that	habits	and	behaviour	cannot	be	
changed	by	reflective	will,	but	only	environmentally.	A	difficulty	of	Raviasson	and	
Deleuze’s	accounts	of	vitalism	as	a	kind	of	insistent	force	that	permeates	habits,	I	
suggest,	is	that,	under	the	guise	of	suggesting	the	continuous	interpenetration	
environment	and	organism,	it	strangely	reproduces	a	certain	separation	between	the	
two:	one	in	which	an	environment	(spiritual	or	material)	is	endowed	with	
autonomous	life	which	affects	the	receptive/	passive	‘habits	proper’	
(Bergson/Raviasson)	or	‘primary	habits’	(Deleuze)	of	the	organism	to	instantiate	the	
change.	A	pragmatist	consideration	of	the	organising	energies	of	transaction,	
situation	and	experience	point	to	wider	socio-environmental	conditionings	that	
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point	to	complex	geographies	between	the	‘forceful	materialism’	and	‘affect	milieu’	
identified	in	current	geographical	research	(Dewsbury	and	Bissell	2015).	
This	brings	us	to	the	distinction	between	ideas	of	life	force	and	mechanism.		This	
debate	has	persisted	in	different	guises	in	philosophy	over	several	hundred	years.		
Ravaisson	was	in	some	senses	responding	in	his	time	(Of	Habit	was	published	in	
1838)	to	the	growing	influence	of	natural	science	which	threatened	to	explain	much	
of	human	life	in	mechanistic	terms,	and	to	which	the	idea	of	vital	life	was	a	repost	to	
defend	a	theistic	idea	of	spirit.		In	terms	of	the	contemporary	debate	over	habits	
Deleuze	takes	the	idea	of	life	force	but	as	a	mechanism	of	the	constant	force	of	
matter.	In	contrast	Dewey	sees	habit	as	mechanism	that	differently	organises	life	
force.	
Testa	(2017)	has	argued	recently	that	in	Human	Nature	and	Conduct	Dewey	
developed	a	strong	criticism	of	ideas	of	life	force	(such	as	Bergson’s	vitalism,	and,	by	
implication,	Ravaisson’s	on	whom	Bergson	draws)	that	“assume	a	dualism	between	
life	and	mechanism”	(Testa	2017:	9).	Dewey	argues	that	all	life	is	mechanism.	In	the	
case	of	human	organisms	it	is	a	physiological	structure,	reaching	into	the	
environment,	which	constitutes	a	mode	of	spontaneous	response.		But	as	we	have	
seen	in	his	idea	of	habit	“mechanisation	is	not	of	necessity	all	there	is	to	habit”	
(Dewey	1981a:	50,	emphasis	in	original).	It	also	permits	creativity	or	virtuosity	(an	
intelligent	rather	than	routine	use	of	mechanism).		
Dewey’s	point	that	‘all	life	is	mechanism’	is	made	in	a	number	of	ways.	First	is	the	
basic	differentiation	between	organic	forms	of	life	with	more	complex	organisms	
having	more	interactive	mechanisms:	
“All	life	operates	through	a	mechanism,	and	the	higher	the	form	of	life	the	more	
complex,	sure	and	flexible	the	mechanism.		This	fact	alone	should	save	us	from	
opposing	life	and	mechanism,	thereby	reducing	the	latter	to	unintelligent	
automatism	and	the	former	to	an	aimless	splurge”	(Dewey	1981a:	51)	
Habits	as	mechanisms	can	take	different	forms,	in	terms	of	levels	of	skill,	or	intensity,	
and	have	different	levels	of	energy	across	(and	indeed	within)	organisms.	Thus,	
rather	than	a	separation	of	creative	élan	vital	from	habit	to	allow	some	for	some	sort	
of	spontaneity	in	nature,	Dewey	maintains	that	all	forms	of	action,	from	mechanical	
action	through	to	that	of	the	creativity	of	the	artist,	are	just	different	types	of	
mechanism.	As	Testa	(2017)	argues,	habit	for	Dewey	is	ability,	an	art	that	is	formed	
by	past	experience.		Habits	can	be	expressive:	the	virtuoso	artist	or	performer	is	the	
accomplished	technician	“who	fuses	mechanism	with	thought	and	feeling”	(Dewey	
1981a:	51).	There	are	habits	that	are	full	of	energy	and	expansiveness	and	other	
habits	that	stagnate	and	delimit	growth:	‘living’	and	‘dead’	habits	respectively	
(1981a).		Flexible	habits	have	to	be	instantiated	in	an	automatic	way,	just	as	much	as	
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inflexible	ones.	The	force	and	impact	of	life	energy	can	also	change	within	
mechanisms,	as	living	habits	become	dead	ones,	as	intelligent,	reflexive	habits	
become	inflexible	and	routine.	Mechanisms	of	social	habit	(customs)	organise	more	
impulsive,	spontaneous	behaviour:	“the	meaning	of	native	activities	is	not	native:	it	
is	acquired.		It	depends	on	interaction	with	a	matured	social	medium”	(1981a:	65).		
Thus	the	force	of	habit	varies	with	the	changing	nature	of	the	(biosocial)	
environment.		This,	I	suggest,	has	a	double	effect:	in	the	organisation	of	repetition	
‘going	in’	to	habit	(in	contrast	to	the	linear	effect	of	materialism)	and	in	the	way	
repetition	is,	or	is	not,	‘taken	up’	–	the	force	(or	otherwise)	that	it	has.		Some	forces	
may	misfire,	or	not	‘catch’	in	this	way.		Life	force	requires	organisation.		That	is	why	
Dewey	criticises	the	‘aimless	spurge’	that	he	attributes	to	part	of	Bergson’s	(and	by	
implication	Ravaisson’s)	idea	of	vitalism.			
Mechanisms	of	habit	interacting	in	a	matured	social	medium	inevitably	lead	to	a	
plurality	of	habitual	dispositions	or	ways	of	responding.			In	seeing	life	force	as	
insistent	pressure	contracted	by	habits	into	the	aesthetics	of	bodily	practices	and	
subjectivities,	contemporary	geographical	research	has	been	less	concerned	with	
this	field	of	contestation	of	habits.	Conflict	over	habits	and	the	plurality	of	habits,	for	
an	individual	organism	or	a	group	of	human	organisms,	finally	brings	the	cognitive	
phase	of	action	into	play.	Again	in	geography	the	focus	on	habit	and	affect	eclipses	
any	considerations	of	the	relationship	between	habit	and	cognition	or	‘thought’,	
especially	when	the	latter	is	assumed	to	be	associated	with	sovereign	will	and	reason.			
For	Dewey	conflict	between	habits	requires	resolution	and	that	demands	reflective	
judgement	on	habit	or	the	justification	between	conflicting	habits.	It	is	here	that	
Dewey’s	criticism	of	the	separation	of	mechanism	and	life	in	relation	to	habit	has	
real	bite	in	terms	of	wider	social	critique.		Habit	can	become	(or	be	enforced	as)	a	
mechanism	that	is	opposed	to	life,	in	forms	of	“over-mechanisation”	(Testa	2017,	11)	
in	which	organic	mechanization	is	turned	into	inorganic	mechanisation.		This,	for	
example,	informs	Dewey’s	analysis	of	the	reification	of	industrial	labour	in	which	
living	patterns	of	interaction	become	routine	habit	and	the	mechanisation	of	
production	turns	the	habits	of	workers	into	mechanistic	ones:	reinforcing	an	historic	
division	between	the	labour/working	class	and	leisure/bourgeois	classes.		Thus	a	
duality	of	life	and	mechanism	can	become	a	force	of	social	domination	and	
oppression
2
.	Dewey	goes	on	to	suggest	how	dualities	of	life	and	mechanism	can	be	
overcome,	through	interventions	aimed	at	meliorating	and	reforming	the	
environment	and	situation	of	habits.	
The	final	contrast	between	Ravaissonian/Deleuzian	and	pragmatist	approaches	to	
habit	is	in	the	relationship	of	habit	to	time	and	space.		Deleuze’s	emphasis	on	
																																																								
2	Here	Dewey’s	social	critique	has	connections	to	ideas	of	reification	and	alienation	
in	Marxism	(Bridge	2013).	
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emergence	and	constant-becoming	puts	habit	in	the	present	as	a	contraction	of	
nature	but	with	a	passive	relation	to	time	through	the	“the	thousands	of	passive	
syntheses”	of	organic	composition,	“the	moving	soil	occupied	by	the	passing	present”	
(Deleuze	1995,	79).		Memory	is	a	more	active	synthesis	of	time	but	one	that	
particularises	through	analogy	(and	thus	loses	difference	or	novelty).		Deleuze’s	
orientation	is	to	virtuality:	the	press	of	the	future	in	the	present,	through	the	
repetition	of	singularities.			
In	contrast,	the	Deweyan	approach	to	habit	emphasises	a	‘live’	present	infused	with	
the	possibilities	of	the	past,	in	which	“the	present	is	complex,	containing	within	its	
self	a	multitude	of	habits	and	impulses”	(Pedwell,	2016,	110).		Progress	is	an	increase	
in	present	meaning	(110)	in	environment/organism	transactions.		In	terms	of	my	
arguments	about	the	links	between	habit,	situation	and	experience	-	enduring	and	
extensive	spatio-temporal	situations	(of	human,	non-human	and	object	relations)	in	
experience	are	potentially	relevant	to	the	immediate	problematic	situation.	Dewey	
(2012)	seems	to	imply	that	these	extensive	and	enduring	environments	instantiated	
in	habit	and	action	can	be	thought	of	as	a	kind	of	meta-situation.		Unlike	the	ever-
becoming,	emergent,	future-forcing	emphasis	of	Ravaisson	and	Deleuze,	this	
operation	of	combined	experience	through	habit	charges	or	‘inhabits’	the	present	
(Pedwell	2016)
3
.	Whilst	still	sharing	a	process	ontology	this	pragmatist	approach	
opens	up	the	present	to	more	active,	action-orientated	intervention	than	
Deleuze/Ravaisson-inspired	geographical	research	in	which	habit	is	a	‘passive	
synthesis’	in	a	passing	present.	
A	charged	present	offers	the	potential	for	a	re-arrangement	of	habit	environments	
and	the	possibilities	of	changing	the	mechanisms	of	habits	through	social	reform.	In	
the	next	section	I	consider	several	aspects	of	this:	education	policy	and	the	
formation	of	habits;	overcoming	the	clash	of	habits	to	enable	collaborative	
mobilisation	for	welfare	reform;	the	relationship	between	habits	and	institutions	
through	institutional	design	and	innovation	for	social	reform;	the	role	of	habit	in	
framing	environmental	policy.			This	captures	the	range	of	influences	of	habit:	from	
their	formation;	conflict	of	established	habits;	the	institutionalisation	of	habits;	and	
habits	as	the	background	condition	of	wider	problematisations,	such	as	
environmentalism.		
																																																								
3	This	orientation	to	a	complex	present	reflects,	I	suggest,	Dewey’s	wider	suspicion	
of	treatments	of	change	as	ever-becoming,	in	what	he	calls	philosophies	of	flux,	
which	actually	reveal	“the	intensity	of	feeling	for	the	sure	and	the	fixed”	(Dewey	
1981b:	49).		Philosophies	of	flux	(in	which	he	includes	Bergson’s	ideas)	“[defy]	
change	by	making	it	universal,	regular,	sure”	(49),	yet	another	quest	for	certainty,	
rather	than	“a	call	to	effort,	a	challenge	to	investigation,	a	potential	doom	of	disaster	
and	death”	(49).	
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Habit,	situation	and	public	policy	
In	this	section	I	consider	two	historical	interventions	in	habit	formation	and	the	clash	
of	habits	from	Dewey’s	own	time	(in	which	he	was	personally	involved)	before	going	
on	to	discuss	contemporary	pragmatist-inspired	analyses	of	the	relationship	
between	habits	and	institutional	change	and	the	role	of	habit	in	pragmatist	
environmental	policy.		In	all	these	cases	the	relationship	between	habits	and	
problematisation	are	key.	
A	focus	on	the	mechanisms	of	habit	(and	concern	with	over-mechanisation)	relates	
strongly	to	the	formation	of	habits,	especially	in	the	young.		As	a	philosopher	Dewey	
is	probably	best	known	for	his	work	on	education	(Dewey	1980;	2008a).	He	thought	
that	education	policy	and	practice	could	help	cultivate	more	intelligent	habits.	He	
criticised	the	US	schooling	system	for	its	chalk-and-talk	approach	to	learning	and	its	
mechanised	way	of	inculcating	habits	(in	the	form	of	social	customs)	into	pupils,	an	
approach	that	denied	them	their	natural	capacities	as	problem-solving	organisms	
transacting	with	their	environment.		There	was	creative	potential	that	could	be	
encouraged	in	the	young	before	their	habits	became	too	set.	This	is	why	Dewey	put	
so	much	emphasis	on	education	as	a	catalyst	for	social	reform	more	widely.		
For	Dewey	the	problem	with	the	education	system	was	that	it	embedded	and	
reproduced	certain	traditional	values,	that	at	a	broader,	philosophical	level,	
separated	theory	from	practice,	body	from	mind,	culture	from	utility	and	the	
labouring	from	the	leisure	classes	(Westbrook	1991,	172-3).		In	1894	he	established	
the	Laboratory	School	in	Chicago	to	instigate	his	ideas	of	cooperative	problem-
solving	education.		In	this	approach	pupils’	habits	were	challenged	by	problematic	
situations	(introduced	as	part	of	the	curriculum)	through	which	their	different	habits	
and	perspectives	were	brought	to	bear	in	order	to	solve,	in	collaboration	with	other	
pupils	(rather	than	as	individuals).		As	we	saw	in	the	relationship	between	habit	and	
enquiry,	habits	are	also	the	first	move	in	the	formulation	of	problem-solutions.		Thus	
in	teaching	children	how	to	think	it	was	important	not	to	force	“a	line	of	action	
contrary	to	natural	inclinations”	(Dewey	1980:	41,	see	Westbrook	1991,	172)	but	to	
incorporate	‘present	occupations’	into	the	curriculum	to	use	those	dispositions	in	
situations	that	best	opened	them	up	to	other	influences	and	inclinations,	through	
cooperative	enquiry.	The	school	as	a	micro-social	world	allowed	experimentation	
with	forms	of	cooperative	enquiry	and	problem	solving	that	would	usher	in	more	
established	forms	of	knowledge	(such	as	scientific	knowledge).		In	re-orientating	
education	away	from	mechanised	habit	to	habit	as	fuel	for	creative	and	cooperative	
problem	solving	the	Dewey	school	had	considerable	success	(Mayhew	and	Edwards	
1966)	
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As	well	as	policy	work	on	the	formation	of	habits	in	children,	the	clash	of	already-
established	habits	of	adults	can	be	both	obstructive	and	productive	for	further	social	
reform.		The	significance	of	habit	in	experiments	in	social	reform	was	evident	in	the	
case	of	the	19
th
/20
th
	century	settlement	house	movement,	in	which	middle-class	
philanthropists	lived	and	worked	in	low	-income	neighbourhoods	to	try	to	facilitate	
different	forms	of	welfare	reform.		This	movement,	inspired	by	Toynbee	Hall	in	
London,	spread	across	cities	of	the	US	and	formed	a	nascent	welfare	movement,	
some	of	the	initiatives	of	which	were	later	institutionalised	by	the	US	Federal	State.		
One	key	catalyst	of	this	movement	was	the	Hull	House	settlement	in	a	poor	Italian-
American	neighbourhood	in	Chicago,	run	by	Jane	Addams,	a	pragmatist	collaborator	
with	Dewey	(Dewey	was	on	the	Board	of	Trustees	of	Hull	House).		
In	trying	to	establish	collaboration	between	middle-class	philanthropists	and	
working-class	residents,	class	and	ethnic	divisions	were	negotiated	through	the	
‘interspatialities’	(Jackson	2001)	of	Hull	House,	using	different	contexts	of	interaction	
to	break	down	and	reshape	underlying,	embodied	habits.	Dance	classes,	a	range	of	
sporting	activities,	drama	and	musical	performance	were	all	used	as	ways	of	easing	
the	embodied	encounter	and	developing	trust	and	collaboration	between	Hull	House	
and	neighbourhood	residents.		Working	on	habit	in	this	way	helped	provide	the	
platform	for	stronger	collaboration	on	wider	social	initiatives	-	over	childcare,	air	
pollution,	neighbourhood	laundry	facilities	and	mutual	savings	schemes,	to	name	but	
a	few	(Addams	1969).	
As	well	the	clash	of	habits	producing	the	conditions	for	experimental	social	reform	
habit	has	also	become	the	focus	for	more	formal	policy	intervention.		In	a	
contemporary	context	one	prominent	example	is	‘nudge’	policy,	which	
acknowledges	the	significance	of	habit	in	human	behaviour,	but	uses	various	cues	
and	incentives	to	‘nudge’	habitual	behaviour	in	a	different	direction	(Thaler	and	
Sunstein	2008).		From	a	pragmatist	perspective	Pedwell	(2017)	critiques	nudge	policy	
pointing	to	its	overly-individualised	idea	of	habit	and	its	narrow	focus	on	certain	acts	
or	events	that	provide	the	opportunity	for	nudging	‘bad’	choices	towards	‘good’	
ones
4
.		In	contrast	Pedwell	(2017)	argues	for	a	pragmatist	approach	which	offers	a	
deeper	analysis	of	the	environmental	conditioning	of	habits	and	the	understanding	
that	they	are	dispositions	or	modes	of	behaviour	that	require	much	more	broadly	
coordinated	and	collaborative	policy	responses.			This	sees	interventions	in	
societal/environmental	rather	than	individual	terms.	In	the	same	vein	Schwanen	et	
al	(2012)	looking	at	transport	geographies	see	the	wider	environment	of	habit	as	
crucial	in	changing	patterns	of	behaviour,	in	this	case	encouraging	less	car	use	in	the	
bid	for	low-carbon	mobilities.		Taking	inspiration	from	Dewey’s	emphasis	on	
																																																								
4	Its	‘libertarian	paternalism’	is	also	a	target	of	pragmatist	critique	–	see	also	
Jones	et	al	(2011).	
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changing	the	objective	conditions	of	habit	(rather	relying	on	changes	of	thought	or	
intention	on	the	one	hand,	or	nudging	habits	on	the	other)	Schwanen	et	al	use	his	
idea	of	custom	as	social	habits	to	recommend	that	broader	infrastructural	change	
and	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders	(beyond	individual	car	users)	are	required	to	
transition	to	non-car	based	mobility.		They	too	look	to	the	younger	generation	and	
education	initiatives	to	encourage	the	formation	of	low-carbon	mobility	habits,	
pointing	to	societies	where	these	customs	are	more	developed	(such	as	the	cycling	
culture	in	the	Netherlands).			
The	level	of	operation	needed	to	deal	with	the	distributed	nature	of	habit,	in	
combination	with	Dewey’s	idea	that	social	habits	congeal	as	customs	and	are	
institutionalised	in	various	ways,	means,	I	would	argue,	that	institutional	design	is	a	
particularly	appropriate	level	of	intervention	in	pragmatist	policy-making.		This	
accords	with	pragmatist-inspired	economic	thinking,	which	sees	institutional	forms	
of	activity	as	being	based	on	habits	(Veblen	2002	[1919]),	what	Gronow	(2008)	calls	
‘habitual	institutionalism’.		This	challenges	the	utilitarian,	individualist	cost-benefit	
(rational-choice)	approaches	that	dominate	contemporary	policy	assessments	and	
interventions.		It	also	opposes	behavioural	economics,	which	does	focus	on	the	role	
of	habit	(such	as	in	nudge	policy),	but	in	ways	that	are	overly	individualise	habits,	
and	are	concerned	with	acts,	rather	than	more	continuous	distributed	modes	of	
action,	as	Pedwell	(2017)	argued.			
Pragmatist-inspired	institutional	and	policy	analysts	explore	various	institutional	
design	mechanisms	that	get	us	beyond	rational-choice	mechanisms	of	incentive	
compatibility	between	institutions	and	citizens,	or	behavioural	architectures	that	
seek	to	nudge	towards	good	behaviour.	They	advocate	institutional	experimentation	
as	a	way	of	dealing	with	the	effects	of	new	types	of	interactions	and	entanglements	
on	habits	in	human,	non-human,	object	assemblages	that	produce	new	problematic	
situations.			
	
Pragmatic	analysis	also	suggests	a	second	(higher)-order	function	of	democratic	
input	in	the	monitoring	of	the	outcomes	of	different	institutional	choices	that	result	
from	experimentation.	This	is	also	a	way	of	structuring	disagreement	over	different	
institutional	choices,	as	well	as	dealing	with	the	associated	costs	of	institutional	
experimentation	for	different	sections	of	the	population	(Knight	and	Johnson	2011).		
Institutional	experimentation	and	monitoring	involves	a	range	of	deliberative	
forums,	such	as	citizen’s	juries	and	public	evaluation	committees.		This	is	what	
Archon	Fung	has	called	pragmatic	equilibrium	–	where	democratic	agreement	is	
achieved	through	the	pragmatic	testing	of	the	consequences	of	different	
institutional	forms	and	policy	architectures.	He	contrasts	pragmatic	equilibrium	to	
the	famous	“reflective	equilibrium”	of	Rawls’s	(1972)	cognitive,	rationalist	approach	
to	political	disagreement	and	conflict	in	liberal,	pluralist	societies.		What	I	argue	here	
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is	that	this	pragmatic,	experimental,	action-oriented	approach	to	institutional	
innovation	explicitly	engages,	and	productively	acknowledges,	the	role	of	established	
habits	and	the	clash	of	habits	to	a	much	greater	extent	than	its	cognitive,	rational-
choice	equivalent.		Fung	outlines	a	series	of	initiatives	that	demonstrate	this	
institutional	experimentation,	such	as	local,	community-led	institutional	innovations	
to	counter	racist	policing	practices	and	over	school	reform	in	certain	African-
American	neighbourhoods	in	Chicago	(Fung	2001),	as	well	as	the	use	of	citizen’s	
juries	to	decide	new	political	institutional	arrangements	in	the	form	of	a	new	voting	
system	in	British	Columbia,	Canada	(Fung	2007;	see	also	Wright	and	Fung	2003).		
	
Finally,	(and	briefly)	beyond	more	immediate	institutional	concerns,	habit	can	also	
provide	the	context	for	the	widest	possible	level	of	problematisation	and	policy-
framing.			Environmental	pragmatism	has	a	distinctive	approach	to	environmental	
ethics	and	policy	in	arguing	against	prominent	(non-anthropological)	arguments	that	
place	an	intrinsic	value	on	nature,	separate	from	human	interests	(Light	and	Katz	
1996;	Weston	1985).	Central	to	this	is	pragmatism’s	‘transactional	realism’	(Sleeper	
1986)	that	denies	the	separation	of	organism-environment	in	which,	as	I	have	
discussed,	habits	(including	human	habits)	and	values	are	‘in’	the	environment,	just	
as	much	as	the	environment	is	in	habit.		A	plurality	of	habits	and	values	inhere	in	the	
environment,	towards	which	a	deliberative	approach	to	environmental	ethics	must	
be	addressed	(rather	than	the	more	prominent	unitary,	all-encompassing	approach)	
as	part	of	more	participatory,	democratic	process	of	environmental	policy-making	
(Norton	1991;	Minteer	2012).	
	
Conclusion	
A	pragmatist	approach	to	the	role	of	habit	as	the	intermediary	in	organism-
environment	relations	has	a	number	of	aspects	that	recommend	it	for	geographical	
analysis.		First,	like	the	current	Deleuze	or	Ravaisson-inspired	research	the	
pragmatist	idea	of	organism-environment	transactions	acknowledges	a	vital	
environment.	Through	its	idea	of	experience	as	objective	force	it	also	recognises	the	
continuity	of	human	life	with	nature.		However,	by	refusing	to	grant	autonomous	
force	to	life	(élan	vital),	it	avoids	the	more	transcendental	aspects	of	vitalist	
approaches	to	habit	(spirit	for	Ravaisson,	an	insistent	materialism	for	Deleuze).		This	
insistent	empirical	orientation	of	pragmatism	suggests	how	habit,	rather	than	simply	
being	contraction	of	life	force,	is	a	mechanism	of	organisation	of	life	forces	with	
different	levels	of	expression,	some	of	which	may	be	improvised	or	spontaneous	
(such	as	mechanisms	underlying	artistic	expression)	in	the	way	that	a	vitalist	
approach	suggests,	but	others	of	which	might	be	(over)	mechanised	and	persistent	
in	ways	that	constrict	life.		
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I	think	this	gives	scope	to	problematize	the	mechanisms	of	habit	much	more	than	its	
vitalist	rendering	in	geography.		Rather	than	creating	dualisms	between	’habit	
memory’	and	‘habit	proper’	(the	latter	resulting	from	life	force)	a	pragmatist	view	
sees	habit	as	on	a	continuum	of	organisational	forms	that	mediate	natural	forces	
(associated	with	different	higher	organisms;	from	mechanised	to	more	expressive	
habits	within	organisms).		This	makes	what	is	an	emergent	dispositional	view	of	habit	
much	more	open	to	problematisation	and	intervention.		Attention	to	mechanisms	
and	levels	of	organisation	starts	to	distinguish	different	environments	of	habit,	which,	
for	higher	organisms,	are	extensive	and	complex.		This	gives	scope	for	geographical	
analysis	of	environments	of	habit	and	tracing	the	relativities	of	space	(treated	as	
extensive	situations	or	fields	that	such	habits	encompass).	A	pragmatist	idea	of	habit	
also	problematizes	time,	but	rather	than	deflating	the	role	of	the	present	as	Deleuze	
does	(part	of	the	wider	20
th
	century	critique	of	the	metaphysics	of	presence),	
pragmatism	uses	a	process	ontology	to	understand	the	present	as	funded	or	‘live’	
and	open	to	possibilities	of	intervention.		In	this	present,	habits	are	interrupted	by	
problematic	situations	but	are	also	the	first	point	of	their	resolution.			
As	well	as	problematizing	different	mechanisms	of	habit	(for	the	purposes	of	analysis	
and	intervention)	a	Deweyan	approach	to	habit	also	situates	habit	in	relation	to	
different	forms	of	problematisation.		Whereas	vitalist	approaches	in	geography	see	
habits	contracting	immanent	forces	realised	in	‘affective	milieu’	(Dewsbury	and	
Bissell	2015)	for	pragmatists	the	partner	of	habit	is	problematisation,	because,	as	life	
function,	habit	encounters	frequent	difficulties	or	objections.		The	affectual	milieu	of	
the	vitalists	corresponds	to	the	situational	qualities	of	affect	in	pragmatism	but	
which,	in	the	latter,	are	understood	as	the	prompts	of	emerging	problematic	
situations.		This	problematisation	demands	experimental	action,	involving	habits	and	
situational	materials,	and	only	more	latterly,	if	at	all,	more	reflexive	forms	of	action	
in	controlled	enquiry	in	which	‘thought’	is	a	shared	communicative	activity.		
Analysing	habit	in	relation	to	problematisation	and	enquiry	again	means	exploring	
habits	and	their	spatio-temporal	relations	-	from	extensive	and	enduring	situations	
of	habit	dispositions	to	the	sharper,	more	emphatic	and	more	immediate	
problematic	situations	where	habits	are	disrupted.	Deleuzian-inspired	geographical	
work	has	shown	how	human/non-human/material	assemblages	infuse	‘plastic	habits’	
(Dewsbury	2015).		Pragmatism	acknowledges	this	‘thingliness’	of	the	world	
(Colebrook	2015)	whilst,	at	the	same	time,	showing	how	these	entanglements	
problematize	human	life	through	habit.	
The	possibilities	of	intervention	in	complex	mechanisms	of	habit	were	suggested	in	
the	previous	examples	of	policy	strategies	to	address	the	formation,	clash	and	
institutionalisation	of	habits.	Pragmatism	recognises	that	habits	are	not	just	
significant	in	terms	of	policy	intervention	but	are	also	open	to	manipulation	and	
domination	in	the	‘over-mechanisation’	of	habit	(between	the	labouring	and	leisure	
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classes,	for	example).		These	issues	bring	pragmatism	into	productive	conversation	
with	the	continuing	influence	of	Marxism	and	Critical	Theory	on	social	and	
environmental	critique	in	geography	(Bridge	2013).		At	the	same	time	pragmatism	
recognises	the	difficulties	of	the	Marxist	prospectus	precisely	because	it	fails	to	
address	social	habits	that	persist	beyond	revolutionary	disruption.		
A	pragmatist	approach	to	habit	opens	up	research	on	persistent	mechanisms	of	
social	domination	with	the	more	vital	idea	of	habit	environments	in	geography.		
Building	on	current	geographical	work	that	starts	to	take	Bourdieu’s	ideas	on	
embodied	habits	beyond	the	social	(Lea	et	al	2015)	a	pragmatist	approach	combines	
a	greater	sensitivity	to	the	complexes	of	actors	(human,	nonhuman,	objects)	
implicated	in	habit	milieu	whilst	maintaining	a	critique	of	mechanisms	of	habit	that	
are	persistent	and	significant	in	social	relations.		In	this	regard	there	is	already	a	
significant	body	of	work	within	pragmatist	philosophy	and	sociology	on	forms	of	
social-environmental	domination	through	habit,	such	as	MacMullan	(2009)	on	
‘habits	of	whiteness’	and	Sullivan’s	(2013)	analysis	of	racism	as	a	form	of	
discrimination	and	domination	that	penetrates	through	the	skin	of	the	human	
organism	producing	‘oppression	in	the	gut’.			
Pragmatism’s	positioning	of	the	relationship	between	habit	and	problematisation	
also	opens	up	a	wider	terrain	of	investigation	that	draws	on	a	strong	strand	of	
Foucault-inspired	poststructuralist	analysis	in	geography	(Murdoch	2005;	Crampton	
and	Elden	2007).	Foucault’s	work	looked	at	how	different	complexes	of	
problematisation,	for	example	the	problematisation	of	population	density	and	ideas	
of	vulnerability	to	disease	and	contagion	in	the	plague	town	in	Discipline	and	Punish	
(Foucault	1977),	have	been	seen	to	coalesce	into	persistent	(spatialised)	forms	of	
governmentality	and	surveillance,	resulting	in	certain	forms	of	subjectivity.			
Exploring	the	field	of	problematisation	with	a	wider	idea	of	the	possible	sites	of	
problematisation,	including,	but	also	beyond,	‘governmental’	ones	(see	Koopman	
2011;	Barnett	and	Bridge	2017),	and	from	the	perspective	of	habit	rather	than	
subjectivity,	further	opens	up	the	terrain	of	investigation	on	forms	of	social	power	
(and	the	possibilities	of	resistance	and	democratic	action).		It	also	opens	up	other	
theoretical	questions,	such	as	the	degree	to	which	problematisations	lead	to	new	
concepts	(Deleuze	–	see	Koopman	2018)	or	to	new	actions	(Dewey)	as	forms	of	
critique	of	society	and	space.			
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